The purpose of this paper is to introduce a generalized C-concave condition, and by using Himmelberg's fixed point theorem, to prove a new existence theorem of Nash equilibrium in non-compact generalized game with C-concavity. As applications, we shall prove a minimax theorem in non-compact settings and prove a minimax inequality in compact settings.
Introduction
In 1951, Nash established the well-known equilibrium existence theorem for N -person games. Since then, the classical results of Nash [18] , Debreu [2, 3] and Nikaido and Isoda [19] have served as basic references for the existence of Nash equilibrium for non-cooperative games. Next, in 1977, Friedman [9] established a generalization of the Nash theorem using the quasiconcavity assumption on every payoff function. In all of them, convexity of strategy spaces, continuity and concavity/quasi-concavity of the payoff functions were assumed. Till now there have been a number of generalizations, and also many applications of those theorems have been found in several areas, e.g., see [1, 9] and references therein.
Two important concepts for removing the concavity/quasi-concavity assumptions of the payoff functions are marked by the seminal papers of Fan [5, 6] for 2-person zero-sum games, and the complete abandonment of concavity in Nishimura and Friedman [20] . In fact, the concept of concavelike payoffs due to Fan [6] does not require any linear structure on the strategy space. However, Joó [13] gave a general sum 2-person game where the payoff functions are continuous and concavelike, but the game has no Nash equilibrium. Horváth and Joó [11] also show that higher smoothness of the payoff functions does not change the situation. In [8] , Forgó introduced the CF-concavity by adding continuity to Fan's concavelike condition, and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
In a recent paper [16] , the authors introduced the C-concavity which generalizes both concave condition and CF-concavity without assuming the linear structure, and next, they proved an existence theorem of Nash equilibrium and its applications using the C-concavity. And, more recently, Kim and Kum [15] further generalize the C-convexity using constraint correspondences, and they prove an equilibrium existence theorem for a compact generalized N -person game.
In this paper, we will introduce a C-concave condition which generalizes both concave condition and CF-concavity without assuming the linear structure. Using this C-concavity and the partition of unity argument, we shall prove a new existence theorem of Nash equilibrium for non-compact generalized games. And we shall give a new minimax theorem and a minimax inequality as its applications. Those results generalize the existence theorems in [4, 8, 15, 16, 18, 19] to non-compact generalized games with C-concavity. Finally we shall give an example of a game where C-concavity can be applied; but the concavity/quasi-concavity in [9, [11] [12] [13] [14] 17, 20 ] cannot be applied.
Preliminaries
We begin with some notations and definitions. Let A be a subset of a topological space X. We shall denote by 2 A the family of all subsets of A. Let I be a countable index set. For each i ∈ I , let X i be a non-empty topological space and denote X := i∈I X i and Xˆi :
Throughout this paper, all topological spaces are assumed to be Hausdorff. Let I = {1, . . . , n, . . .} be a countable set of players. A non-cooperative generalized game Γ of normal form is an ordered tuple (X 1 , . . . , X n , . . . ; f 1 , . . . , f n , . . .) where for each player i ∈ I , the non-empty set X i is the player's pure strategy space, and f i : X = i∈I X i → R is the player's payoff function. The set X, joint strategy space, is the Cartesian product of the individual strategy sets, and an element of X i is called a strategy of the ith player. A strategȳ x = (x 1 , . . . ,x n , . . .) ∈ X is called a Nash equilibrium for the game Γ if the following system of inequalities holds: for each i ∈ I,
for all x i ∈ X i . When I is an uncountable set of players, we can similarly define the noncooperative game Γ of normal form, and in this case, we also call Γ the non-cooperative generalized game. Here we remark that the model of a game in this paper is a non-cooperative game, i.e., there is no replay communicating between players, and so players act as free agents, and each player is trying to maximize his/her own payoff according to his/her strategy. Now we recall some concepts which generalize the concavity. When X and Y are non-empty arbitrary sets, recall that f : X × Y → R is concavelike on X with respect to Y [6] if for any x 1 , x 2 ∈ X and λ ∈ [0, 1], there exists x 0 ∈ X such that
Adding the continuity to concavelike functions, Forgó [8] introduced the CF-concavity as follows: Let X be a non-empty topological space, Y a non-empty arbitrary set. Then f : X × Y → R is said to be CF-concave on X with respect to Y if there exists a continuous function Ψ :
Also note that by using the induction, we can obtain the equivalent formulations to the concavelike and CF-concave conditions in general forms, respectively, e.g., see [16, Lemma 1] and
Next, we will introduce a concave condition which generalizes both CF-concavity and concavity as follows:
Definition. Let X be a topological space, Y an arbitrary set and D be a non-empty subset of
for all (λ 1 , . . . , λ n ) ∈ Δ n and for all y ∈ Y .
Remarks.
(a) When X = D in Definition, the C-concavity is actually the same as the definition in [16] . In this case, the concavity clearly implies the C-concavity by letting φ n (λ 1 , . . . , λ n ) :
Note that the continuous function φ n need not be defined globally on X × · · · × X n times ×R n as in [8] , but defined only on Δ n in Definition. In fact, for any given n points x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ X, by defining
for each (λ 1 , . . . , λ n ) ∈ Δ n , we can see that the CF-concavity implies the C-concavity. (c) If f is C-concave on X, then for any given points x 1 , x 2 ∈ X and for each λ ∈ [0, 1], by defining x 0 := φ 2 (λ, 1 − λ), we can see that f is concavelike on X. Therefore, the following implication diagram holds:
To prove the existence theorems in non-compact settings, we shall need the following special form of Himmelberg's fixed point theorem: 
New existence theorem of Nash equilibrium
Let Γ be a non-cooperative generalized game where I is a countable (possibly uncountable) set of players and X i is the player's pure strategy space. And let the strategy space X := i∈I X i be a non-empty subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space. Now let us define the total sum of payoff functions H : X × X → R ∪ {±∞} associated with the non-cooperative generalized game Γ as follows:
for every 
thenx is a Nash equilibrium for Γ .
Proof. For each i ∈ I , we take any
Then, by substitution, we can see that
for all x i ∈ X i . Therefore, we have
hencex is a Nash equilibrium for Γ . 2
Using the partition of unity argument, we now prove the following existence theorem of Nash equilibrium in non-compact generalized games: Theorem 1. Let I be a countable (possibly uncountable) set of index set, and let Γ be a noncooperative generalized game satisfying the following conditions:
(i) the strategy space X := i∈I X i is a paracompact convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space and D be a non-empty compact subset of X;
Then Γ has a Nash equilibriumx ∈ D, i.e., for each i ∈ I ,
Proof. Suppose the contrary, i.e., assume that Γ has no Nash equilibrium. Then, by Lemma 2, for all x ∈ X, there exists an y ∈ X such that H (x, x) < H (y, x) .
For any z ∈ X, we let
Then, since H is continuous, each U(z) is open (possibly empty) in X; and also we have z∈X U(z) = X. Here, without loss of generality, we may assume that X \ D is non-empty. By the assumption (iv), for each z ∈ X \ D, we have that 
for all (λ 1 , . . . , λ n+1 ) ∈ Δ n+1 and for all x ∈ X.
Next we consider a continuous mapping Ψ : X → D, defined by
Since φ n+1 and each α i are continuous, Ψ is continuous on X. Moreover, Ψ maps a nonempty convex set X into a compact subset D in a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space. Therefore, by Lemma 1, there exists a fixed pointx ∈ D such that Ψ (x) =x. Since H is C-concave on D, we have
for all x ∈ X; and so by putting x :=x, we have
However, ifx ∈ U(z j ) for some 1 j n, then H (x,x) < H (z j ,x) and α j (x) > 0; and if x / ∈ U(z k ) for some 1 k n, α k (x) = 0. Also note that sincex ∈ D,x / ∈ X \ D = U(z n+1 ); and so α n+1 (x) = 0. Therefore, we have
which contradicts (3). This completes the proof. 2
Remarks.
(1) Theorem 1 generalizes the equilibrium existence theorems due to Nash [18] and Forgó [8] in the following aspects: (i) for each i ∈ I , the strategy set X i need not be compact; but the product space X = i∈I X i must be a paracompact convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space; (ii) for each i ∈ I , every payoff function f i need not be concave nor continuous, and H need not be CF-concave; (iii) the set I of players need not be finite.
(2) Theorem 1 can be further generalized by using the constraint correspondences T i as in Definition 1 in [15] . Also it should be noted that in our Theorem 1, the set of players I is a countable (possibly uncountable) set; however, in Theorem 1 in [15] , the set of players I is a finite set.
When the strategy space X = D is compact in Theorem 1, the total sum of payoff functions H (x, y) must be bounded on X × X. In this case, the coercive condition (iv) is automatically satisfied, and so we have the following: Theorem 2. Let I be a countable (possibly uncountable) set of players, and let Γ be a noncooperative generalized game satisfying the following:
(i) the strategy space X := i∈I X i is non-empty compact convex subset of locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space;
Then Γ has at least one Nash equilibrium.
Some applications
As an application of Theorem 1, we shall prove the following minimax theorem in noncompact settings: Let f 1 (x, y) := −f (x, y) and f 2 (x, y) := f (x, y) . In order to apply Theorem 1, we first note that the mapping H : by   H (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) := f 1 (x 1 , y 2 ) + f 2 (x 2 , y 1 ) for each (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 
Theorem 3. Let X and Y be non-empty sets such that X × Y is a paracompact convex in a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space, D a non-empty compact subset of X, and E a non-empty compact subset of Y . Assume that
(a) the function f : X × Y → R is continuous on X × Y ; (b) for each y ∈ Y , the function x → −f (x, y) is C-concave on D; (c) for each x ∈ X, the function y → f (x, y) is C-concave on E; (d) for each (x, y) ∈ D × E, f (x, v) − f (u, y) 0 for all (u, v) ∈ X × Y \ D × E.
Proof.
Then H is clearly continuous, so it suffices to show that the assumptions (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 1 are satisfied. Let two points (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ X × Y be given arbitrarily. Then for {x 1 , x 2 }, by the assumption (b), there exists a continuous function φ 1 :
for every λ ∈ [0, 1] and every v ∈ Y . Also, for {y 1 , y 2 }, by the assumption (c), there exists a continuous function φ 2 :
for every λ ∈ [0, 1] and every u ∈ X. Now we define a continuous function
Then it is easy to see that Φ 2 is a continuous function on Δ 2 . Also, for every λ ∈ [0, 1], we have
For arbitrarily given n points (x 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (x n , y n ) ∈ X × Y , we can similarly define a continuous function
for every (λ 1 , . . . , λ n ) ∈ Δ n , where ψ 1 : Δ 2 → D is a continuous function suitable for f 1 with respect to {x 1 , . . . , x n }, and ψ 2 : Δ 2 → E is a continuous function suitable for f 2 with respect to {y 1 , . . . , y n } in the C-concavity condition. Thus we can also show the condition (1) for the C-concavity of H ; and hence H is C-concave on D × E. It remains to show that H satisfies the coercive condition (iv) in Theorem 1. , y) . Therefore, by assumption (d), we have that for each (x, y) ∈ D × E, H ((x, y) , (x, y)) H ((u, v) , (x, y) ) for all (u, v) ∈ X × Y \ D × E, which implies the assumption (iv) of Theorem 1.
Therefore, by Theorem 1, there exists a Nash equilibrium
Therefore, we have is trivial, and so we obtain the conclusion. 2
As another application of Theorem 2, we shall prove the following which is comparable to the well-known minimax inequality due to Fan [7] : Then, for each x ∈ X, there exists y ∈ X such that f (x, y) > μ. For any y ∈ X, we let and if x / ∈ U(y j ) for some j, then α j (x) = 0.
For such {y 1 , . . . , y n } ⊂ X, since y → f (x, y) is C-concave, there exists a continuous mapping φ n : Δ n → X satisfying the condition
for all (λ 1 , . . . , λ n ) ∈ Δ n and for all x ∈ X. Now consider a continuous mapping Ψ : X → X, defined by
Since φ n and each α i are continuous, Ψ is continuous on X. Moreover, Ψ maps X, which is a compact convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space, into itself. Therefore, by Lemma 1, there exists a fixed pointx ∈ X such that Ψ (x) =x.
On the while, by the C-concavity of f , we have
and so we have
However, ifx ∈ U(y j ) for some 1 j n, then we have f (x, y j ) > μ and α j (x) > 0; and if which is a contradiction. This completes the proof. 2
As we mentioned before, the generalized game described in [8, 19] has an equilibrium if the payoff function f i satisfies either CF-concavity or concavity. Indeed, many of the assumptions made in the preceding theorems in [8, 19] have been weakened and the existence of equilibrium has been proved; however, it is hard to improve the equilibrium theorem by relaxing quasiconcavity assumption of the payoff functions and the convexity assumption on the strategy space. On the other hand, in this paper, we introduce a meaningful C-concavity, and prove a new Nash equilibrium existence theorem. Since the Nash equilibrium is an useful tool in many areas of mathematical economics including oligopoly theory, general equilibrium and social choice theory, the C-concavity should be helpful in developing the theory of Nash equilibrium. Also note that Theorem 1 can be improved to more general spaces by using Eilenberg-Montgomery's fixed point theorem without assuming the linear structure on X.
Finally, we shall give an example where Theorem 1 can be applied but previous results due to Nash [18] , Nikaido and Isoda [19] , and Friedman [9] can not be applied. 
